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Introduction 
Over the last decade evidence-based policy (EBP) emerged as a buzzword intended to signal the end 
of conviction-driven, ideological politics and heralding the aspirations for policy-making to be 
anchored in ‘evidence and to deliver what works unsullied by ideology or values considerations’ 
(Botterill & Hindmoor, 2012: 367; Clarence, 2002). The political impetus and preoccupation with 
activities associated with the idea of EBP are widespread. The belief that rational evidence will 
strengthen the basis for policy-making has been widely welcomed in many policy areas, including in 
contested spheres such as immigration. 
As well as being an issue of profound contemporary relevance, immigration is a highly politicised 
field and the focus of moral and ideological contestation. Thus, evidence, assumed to speak for itself 
(Wesselink et al., 2014) has been called upon as a neutral arbiter in resolving perceived immigration 
problems and as one way of transcending ideological and humanistic conflicts (Spencer, 2011). 
Writing in the context of the various immigration policy crises, Boswell (2009) has shown how policy-
makers have often sought to find solutions to perceived problems of trust and legitimacy by turning 
to evidence in the form of expert knowledge. In this way, the role envisaged for evidence illustrates 
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the trend towards openness and transparency as a way of generating renewed trust and legitimacy. 
Indeed, in political rhetoric, successive UK governments have routinely expressed a commitment to 
opening up immigration debates to allow policy and decisions to be influenced by reliable evidence 
rather than emotion and prejudice in order to increase transparency and build public trust in 
immigration issues (Green, 2010). 
However, more generally, the presentation of evidence as rational and neutral has raised important 
questions of how evidence is identified, mobilised and adjudicated in the policy process (Lowndes, 
2016). Among other things, critics have shown that the perception that evidence is neutral overlooks 
the significance of the context in which evidence is produced. As Wesselink et al. (2014: 342) argue: 
‘what is policy-relevant evidence is determined by context. EBP’s rhetoric looks for neutral, context-
free and universally applicable evidence [which] fits badly with this reality’. Closely related to this is 
the observation that evidence must ultimately be interpreted, a process that many argue involves 
persuasion and arguments (Clarence, 2002; Kesby, 2011; Majone, 1989). As argued by Majone 
(1989) evidence exists only in the context of an argument; thus, it differs from data (raw material) or 
information (categorised data). Moreover, the way that evidence is interpreted is subject to the 
individuals’ understanding of the social world and what they consider to be important (Clarence, 
2002: 5). 
For instance, the assumptions of the policy-maker or a civil servant (working in a policy context) may 
determine what is understood as constituting evidence, the selection or prioritising of one form or 
indeed a specific piece of evidence over another and the interpretation of that evidence in the 
development of an argument (Kesby, 2011: 23). Thus, decisions often reflect not only beliefs about 
what works but judgements about what is feasible as well as elements of ideological faith, 
conventional wisdom and habit (Botterill & Hindmoor, 2012: 369). The presentation of evidence as 
neutral may serve to obscure the real political judgements and serendipities involved in contested 
policy areas like asylum. However, insights can be drawn from Pearce and Raman’s (2014: 390) work 
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on the new randomised controlled trials that interrogates the ways in which appeals to evidence are 
made as a way of opening up the limits of expertise. These authors have suggested what good 
evidence would look like, emphasising the need for evidence to fulfil at least three key principles; 
namely, attentiveness to plurality, diversity and institutions. 
This chapter presents a critical analysis of the ways in which evidence is identified and mobilised in 
the asylum process. It looks at how evidence is actively constructed, embodying processes of 
meaning-making that are underpinned by particular sets of power relations. The chapter draws on 
research from an extreme case the adjudication of faith-based asylum claims, the characteristics of 
which enable us to locate the monsters in the machine more readily. In the spirit of this book we 
make use of the monster metaphor throughout the chapter to highlight issues of potential 
discrimination, prejudice and bias. We also identify a number of other issues inherent in the 
adjudication of faith-based claims and highlight the challenges to evidence-based approaches to the 
determination of refugee status. To better understand the limits of claims to openness and 
transparency via EBP, we have researched the experience of Christian asylum seekers, analysing key 
informants’ narratives and Home Office assessment processes and policy documents. 
We begin with a brief description of the research upon which this chapter is based. We then present 
a discussion of the lived experiences of Pakistani Christians seeking asylum in three sections. We 
start with the context of the experience of reception, followed by the problems of evidencing the 
Christian faith and then the challenges of evidencing persecution before we turn to our conclusions. 
Research design and methodology 
This chapter is based on qualitative research conducted between June and December 2015. Data 
were collected from 40 research participants through interviews, focus groups and informal 
conversations as well as individual case reviews. The sample includes 15 Pakistani Christians (five 
refugees and 10 asylum seekers – five woman and 10 men), with the other 25 participants consisting 
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of migrant support organisations, churches, Pakistani Christian community leaders and professionals 
such as legal advisors, immigration judges and those working in interpretation and translation. 
Snowball sampling and existing contacts facilitated our research access to these participants. The 
research aimed to gain an understanding of Christian asylum seekers’ experiences of seeking asylum 
in the UK. 
The research encounters were audio recorded and transcribed before the analysis, using thematic 
and conversational techniques. While the study has delivered depth, the findings cannot be taken to 
be representative of the experience of Pakistani Christians in the UK or indeed of Christian refugees 
from Muslim majority countries more generally. Our intention was to study the experience of the 
particular individuals we spoke to and to draw ‘analytical generalizations’ (Yin, 2003), that is, 
propositions that could then form the basis of research with a wider sample and in a variety of 
locations. 
Pakistani Christian asylum seekers arrival and UK policy context 
Although there is a long history of migration from Pakistan to the UK, the population of Pakistani 
nationals seeking asylum in the UK became significant towards the end of the 1990s in response to 
the socio-political and religious repressions prevalent in their country of origin. The continual 
deterioration in Pakistan’s human rights situation, particularly in the context of the country’s 
infamous blasphemy laws, which foster the persecution of minority groups such as Christians, has 
seen the country being ranked the sixth highest asylum-producing nation in 2014 (UNHCR, 2014). 
Concurrently, the UK was rated among the top destinations for Pakistani asylum seekers (UNHCR, 
2014). Correspondingly, more recent asylum statistics (Home Office, 2015a) have shown that 
Pakistani nationals constituted the second largest group (registering 2,302 cases after Eritrea, with 
2,583) of all asylum applications lodged in the UK in the year ending June 2015. However, in the 
absence of information on how many of these applications were lodged on the grounds of their 
Christian faith, Pakistani asylum seekers are regarded as a homogenous group. 
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We argue that the presentation of Pakistani asylum seekers as a homogenous ethnic group has the 
danger of masking other individualised identities such as religion or faith, which may in turn obscure 
the context of the reception experience. 
The socio-political atmosphere of the UK is characterised by public and political discourses on 
growing asylum and immigration flows, ethnic and faith diversity, and their supposedly link to 
community tensions and even terrorism (Joppke & Torpey, 2013). Particularly with regard to faith, as 
a presumed secular society the UK presents us with a paradox. On the one hand, successive 
governments have continued to show a public policy interest in faith communities that are often 
portrayed as providing moral leadership, social networks and access to hard-to-reach groups. Yet on 
the other hand, faith has become an unsettling aspect of multiculturalism, not only in the UK, but in 
Europe as a whole, especially in the post-September 11 2001 terrorist attacks (Dinham, Furbey & 
Lowndes, 2009). More specifically, in the UK the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 
2001 and the subsequent 7/7 bombings in London in 2005 have led to public criticism of the concept 
of multiculturalism for its overly tolerant approaches to cultural difference, leading to a growth in 
diversity, segregated societies and the promotion of bad faith (extremism), often associated with 
Muslim identities (Lentin, 2011). Indeed, issues of the perceived and real problems of the integration 
of Muslims, and questions about accommodating Islam as a religion, are at the heart of current 
public policy debates, especially as the current migration crisis continues to unfold, and as Muslim 
identities become increasingly framed by global events (Statham & Tillie, 2016). 
Moreover, the rhetoric of the perceived failure of multiculturalism, especially by political leaders 
across Europe (e.g. Cameron, 2011) has been juxtaposed with the claim to racelessness (Lentin, 
2011). In the context of the claim that society in the UK is now a post-racial one, intolerance towards 
particular groups of immigrants has come to be justified on the basis of their cultural or religious 
incompatibility rather than their race (Statham & Tillie, 2016). Thus the political claim is that that 
culture or religion, rather than race, is to blame for the perceived negative aspects of diversity. 
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When presented in this way, diversity becomes then a happy sign, a sign that racism has been 
overcome (Ahmed, 2007: 164). 
Thus, in both political and public discourse, especially in the UK, it is increasingly claimed that it is no 
longer racist to talk about immigration control and that people can now have a sensible debate 
about immigration, where the notion of sensible involves making use of statistical evidence 
(Anderson, 2013: 42). Pointing out the limits to openness and transparency, Anderson argues that 
‘the claim to racelessness is not paralleled by a claim that immigration policies are not designed to 
keep out certain nationalities‘ (Anderson, 2013: 42), which has the danger of both promoting and 
concealing discriminatory practices towards particular nationalities. 
Immigration controls and border inspections have given rise to perceptions that ‘some bodies more 
than others are recognisable as [dangerous], as bodies that are out of place … because of some trace 
of a dubious origin’ (Ahmed, 2007: 162). Before an actual claim to asylum can be lodged applicants 
must undergo an initial screening process involving check-lists on their country of origin, routes of 
travel, their documentation of identity and their fit in complex ethnic or religious categories. 
The Pakistani Christians who participated in our research experienced their arrival and seeking 
asylum in the UK as putatively Islamophobic. Those we spoke to believed that the Home Office 
operates under the assumption that all migrants from Muslim majority countries, by virtue of their 
place of origin, are Muslims. Thus the conflation of nationality and religion has led Pakistani Christian 
asylum seekers to believe that they are often treated as suspects – a conflation that brings Pakistani 
Muslims and Pakistani Christians together as one othered entity. Writing of her personal experience 
at the borders of New York City as a British citizen with a Muslim background, Ahmed (2007:163) 
claims that ‘for the body recognised as could be Muslim, which translates into could be terrorist … 
the experience begins with discomfort’. 
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We encountered similar experiences among the Pakistani Christians we interviewed, including a 
male asylum seeker who explained: 
As a Christian asylum seeker from a Muslim majority country you face many 
obstacles in putting forward your case. The major obstacle is the place where 
you come from and the way you look – these are things that you can’t change. 
Because of the way we look immigration officials don’t trust us … They don’t 
tell you openly that they are suspicious of you … but through their actions and 
body language, you can tell that you are a suspect. The problem is you can’t 
easily separate Christians from Muslims as we all look the same. … I am a 
Christian, but when people see me they just conclude that I am a Muslim. So 
they think I have come to bomb their country. 
Participants expressed deep concern about the equation of Pakistanis with Muslims, and in turn the 
equation of Muslims with terrorists (Ahmed, 2007), showing how this multi-layered stereotyping 
inevitably functioned to obscure their own distinctive identity as Christians from a Muslim majority 
country. In the sections that follow we delve into the role of evidence in the adjudication of asylum 
claims. 
The adjudication of asylum claims: the policy context 
The UK is signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its subsequent 
Protocol of 1967, as ratified in 1954 and 1968, respectively. According to Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention, an applicant for asylum must have a well-founded fear of persecution; the fear must be 
based on past persecution or the risk of future persecution on one or more of the specific grounds of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The nature of 
evidence that can be provided to support such fears is a key element in the actual process of 
determining whether to provide asylum, as will be discussed below. 
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In line with the UNHCR (2004) instructions on religious persecution, the UK Home Office guidelines 
state that 
Persecution for reasons of religion may take various forms; for example, 
prohibition of membership of a religious community, prohibition of worship in 
private or public, prohibition of religious instruction, requirement to adhere to 
a religious dress code, or serious measures of discrimination imposed on 
persons because they practise their religion or belong to a particular religious 
community. 
However the Home Office goes further to note that 
[t]he simple holding of beliefs which are not tolerated in the country of origin 
will normally not be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status … The 
issues to be decided are whether the claimant genuinely adheres to the 
religion to which he or she professes to belong, how that individual observes 
those beliefs in the private and public spheres, and whether that would place 
him/her at risk of persecution. (Home Office, 2015b: 28) 
These expectations raise the question of the competence of immigration officials in religious matters 
or the extent to which they are qualified to assess the genuineness of individual’s beliefs and the 
manner in which they are practiced in different socio-political and religious contexts. We will return 
to this point later. 
In the asylum process, after getting through the initial screening process, applicants still need to 
undergo a substantive interview in which they are interviewed by an immigration caseworker. The 
burden of proof lies with the applicant. This means that an applicant claiming refugee status on 
grounds of their Christian faith is expected to establish and demonstrate their well-founded fear of 
persecution on the basis of their Christian identity. This involves providing a personal testimony and 
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supporting evidence to prove that they are Christians and that they were persecuted on account of 
their Christian identity. Meanwhile, the UNHCR Guidelines on Burden and Standard of Proof in 
Refugee Claims (1998 para. 2) stress that, while the burden of proof lies with the claimant, decision-
makers are also obligated to have an objective understanding of the situation prevalent in the 
country of origin. It is further suggested that the actual determination of refugee status need not be 
certain, but must be sufficiently likely to be true. Thus, determining whether a claimant qualifies for 
international protection demands that decision-makers judge whether they believe the applicants’ 
evidence, or how much weight should be given to that evidence against their own understandings 
and interpretations of it (Thomas, 2006). 
To assess the credibility of an asylum claim, immigration officials are required to consider three key 
criteria. The first is internal consistency, meaning that the claimants’ oral testimony, written 
statements and any personal documents relating to the material facts of the claim should be 
coherent and reasonably consistent (Home Office, 2015b: 7). Secondly, external consistency is 
required; meaning that the claimants testimony is expected to be consistent with the Country of 
Origin Information or expert evidence. As stated by the Home Office (2015b: 15), ‘the greater the 
correlation between aspects of the account and external evidence, the greater the weight 
caseworkers should attribute to those aspects’. The third criterion is plausibility, which is an 
assessment of the apparent likelihood or truthfulness of a claim ‘in the context of the general 
country information and/or the claimants own evidence about what happened to him or her’ (Home 
Office, 2015b: 15) 
We argue that for external evidence to be effectively used to support personal experience, it needs 
to properly reflect knowledge and expertise about the practical situation on the ground in the 
country of origin. In the Pakistani Christians context, the reliability of the external evidence that the 
Home Office depends upon can be questioned. The Home Office’s latest Country Information and 
Guidance document (February 2015) acknowledges the fact that Christians in Pakistan are generally 
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discriminated against, distinguishing between Christian-born and Christian converts and between 
evangelical and non-evangelical Christians. Christian converts and evangelical Christians are 
perceived to be more at risk than Christian-born individuals. The same document goes on to state 
that ‘in general the (Pakistani) government is willing and able to provide protection against such 
attacks’ (Home Office, 2015b). 
Are these distinctions between Christian born and Christian converts and between evangelical and 
non-evangelical Christians useful and fair, in terms of understanding the kind of persecutions that 
Pakistani Christians face in their everyday lives? What sources and forms of knowledge does the 
Home Office rely upon? We focus on these issues in the sections below. 
Evidencing Christian faith: challenges and pitfalls 
From the perspective of Pakistani Christians seeking protection in the UK, proving ones faith can be a 
challenging exercise if the examination of their faith is based on biblical or doctrinal questions, which 
often do not seem to reflect the reality of individuals’ complex identifications, denominations or 
practical situations in the Pakistani context. Our respondents explained how they were not only 
expected to know and recite certain biblical events but also to speak in certain ways that conform to 
western notions of Christianity. Overall, the challenges lie in the Home Office’s attempt to define 
people’s faith technically, while at the same time assuming it must be coherent and have western or 
European reference points. As one male asylum seeker told us: 
In my interview, I was asked questions like … How do you celebrate Christmas? 
How do you celebrate Easter? … and many other questions. I have now learnt 
that Christmas is a big event in this country not only for Christians but for 
everyone. It’s regarded as a family day, no public transport because everyone 
is celebrating Christmas with their family. But this is not how Christmas is 
celebrated everywhere. In Pakistan some Christians celebrate Christmas while 
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hiding because they don’t want their neighbour to know that they are 
Christian. So when they ask you and you give a different answer from what 
they expect they say you are not a Christian. (Male former asylum seeker) 
A senior legal advisor with extensive experience of working with asylum seekers from Muslim 
majority countries added that 
Regarding the question ‘How do you celebrate Christmas?’ claimants often find 
that very hard, because in their country of origin, Christmas is about a 
particular religion. But, after living here for some years, they have seen that 
‘Oh Christmas is a big issue in this country’. They are even surprised by the fact 
that even Muslims in this country tend to give each other presents at 
Christmas. 
The above examples show the existence of ideological perceptions about how the Christian faith 
ought to be manifested, which suggests that decisions to grant asylum may often be based upon a 
set of tacit assumptions that are not backed by evidence. In line with Pearce and Raman’s (2014: 
390) call for plurality, diversity and the involvement of hybrid institutions in the management of the 
inherent complexity of evidence, some of our participants expressed the need to open up the UK 
asylum system, especially by drawing knowledge and expertise from a cross-section of sources 
including religious institutions. As a female Vicar from the Church of England puts it: 
I think it is vital for the Home Office to consider working hand in hand with 
diverse churches, when it comes to faith-based claims. More notice needs to 
be taken of the pastors, the vicars and all those overseeing peoples’ Christian 
journeys … These should be respected as experts in their own right. 
Such an inclusive approach could in turn help the Home Office to generate a balanced judgement of 
the Christian faith and the ways in which it is lived and experienced in different contexts. 
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Another criticism in our interviews was that, in the absence of diverse sources of evidence, the quiz-
like questioning style in the assessment of the Christian faith may serve to encourage the very 
fraudulent claims that the UKBA authorities fear. In the words of a legal advisor: 
Those questions favour Muslims who are recent converts or faking to be 
converts because they approach the Bible like they’ve approached the Quran 
when they were little. They learn it off by heart as much as they can; it’s all 
very fact-related. 
Decision-makers may seek evidence to support their own pre-existing assumptions and their very 
choice of evidence may be ‘in itself an activity inherently lacking in neutrality’ Clarence, 2002: 5). In 
this way, the judges are susceptible to making incorrect decision in two ways – either by rejecting 
genuine claimants or granting refugee status to fake ones (Thomas, 2006). 
Evidencing religious persecution: unveiling the monsters hiding in the machine 
Existing research has shown that the UK Home Office’s decision-making on asylum claims suffers 
from a systematic and institutionalised culture of disbelief1 which operates, alongside a parallel 
‘culture of denial’ (Souter, 2011: 52; Jubany 2011). In our research it was common for participants to 
explain spontaneously why they felt they were not believed by the UKBA. However, we argue that 
the challenges to the credibility of the evidence offered in religious belief cases, especially those 
involving accusations of blasphemy, seem to be more complex than in other refugee cases, given the 
uniqueness of individual cases and the need to understand the context in which they occur (see 
Kagan, 2010). 
                                           
1 The tendency of those evaluating applications is to start with the assumption that the applicant is not telling 
the truth (Home Affairs Committee, 2013: 11). 
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We observed that for the Pakistani Christians in our study, one key area in which monsters could be 
hiding is in the current Home Office documents on the Pakistani country of origin information, 
particularly the distinction that it makes between evangelical and non-evangelical Christians. In our 
research a pattern emerged that refugee status was not granted on the grounds of religion unless it 
could be proved that an applicant had a religious profile in Pakistan. Yet participants’ accounts of 
how they experienced persecution consistently reveal a stark contrast between the country of origin 
information and the actual situation on the ground in Pakistan where Christians, regardless of their 
religious profile, face persecution in a country where there is limited state protection. In one of our 
interviews a woman asylum seeker who had been refused asylum described how practicing her 
Christian faith in a Muslim school made her a victim of blasphemy accusations. As she explains: 
I was a teacher at a Muslim school. One day I was fasting because it was 
Christian Lent start date on 5th March. At break time, I was sitting in the staff 
room and one Muslim lady teacher … offered me food and forced me to eat 
saying ‘take and eat’. I then said ‘no I am fasting’. I had a big Christian 
magazine I was reading and she asked to see my magazine. She took the 
magazine and the conversation ended there because break period was over… 
The following day she went to the head teacher and report that I was teaching 
Christianity. On the Friday, this teacher’s father came in school and said to me 
‘you gave the magazine to my daughter … I am giving you the chance to accept 
Islam’. In few days I found him waiting on the gate … he was with a group of 
men … One man punched me on the eye … people gathered there, and the 
men were telling the people that she’s preaching Christianity in the school. 
Following the first incident, the woman and her family relocated to another place where, as she 
claimed, she suffered further attacks. She noted that the subsequent incident occurred in front of a 
local police station, but the police did not take any action. Instead, they blamed her for causing 
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problems in the school and proceeded to file a blasphemy case against her on the instructions of her 
accusers. While it is clear from the claimant’s account that she suffered persecution merely by virtue 
of her practicing her Christian faith, as expressed through fasting, her asylum case was ultimately 
dismissed by the Home Office. In her rejection letter, among other things, the Home Office noted 
that 
[y]our previous history shows you can in general live as a Christian born 
without problems in Pakistan … as you don’t seem to have any religious profile 
… Your alleged fear on return is based on threats of persecution from non-
state agents and you have not demonstrated they will be able to have any 
influence over the state … You claim to have reported both incidents to police 
stations … but that these complaints were not fully investigated. However the 
evidence you have provided does not demonstrate that you have made efforts 
to pursue these complaints or take any action regarding the police’s failure to 
investigate … Given that you are a Catholic Christian … it is noted … that there 
is a strong Catholic community in [city] … it is considered that the size and 
diversity [of the population] will allow you to relocate with anonymity, it is 
reasonable to conclude that you will be able to continue practising your 
religion freely and quietly. 
Taken together, the above excerpts show how immigration officials and asylum claimants subscribe 
to radically different narratives about the nature, extent and even the existence of persecution in 
Pakistan. One issue is the Home Office’s seeming misconceptions on the safety of Pakistanis who are 
Christian born in a socio-political environment where Christians in general are routinely targeted and 
abused solely on account of their faith. As one senior legal advisor with experience of dealing with 
Christians from the Muslim majority countries commented: 
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In terms of the Home Office’s point that it’s been going okay for so long for 
Christian born in Pakistan, this is not true for most of the Christians. It’s the 
same thing as swimming in a dangerous stretch of sea every day. You can do it 
safe for three months, and on three months and one day you drown. … So the 
fact that someone has been able to practice their Christian faith in an anti-
Christian society doesn’t mean they are immune to persecution. 
We add that what makes EBP useful also makes it limited: it can become detached from the social 
and political contexts in which persecution occurs, as in this case. 
In some cases the sorts of evidence that claimants present were considered to be low in the 
hierarchy of evidence. This was mainly the case with documentary evidence such as the first 
information report (FIR). These are police reports of crimes against the person now claiming asylum. 
While many of our participants tended to rely on such documents as evidence for their persecution, 
the Home Office invariably dismissed them as fake. On the whole, on reviewing the rejection letters 
we found a pattern whereby the Home Office would increasingly refer to expert evidence to paint a 
broad picture of Pakistanis as fraudulent and opportunistic cheats, and hence potentially bogus 
claimants. In rejection letters, the Home Office routinely stated that 
[d]uring a presentation at the Ninth European Country of Origin Information 
Seminar held in Dublin, Ireland on 26 and 27 May 2004, an Islamabad-based 
representative of the … UNHCR … stated that there is a high level of corruption 
in Pakistan and that it is possible to obtain many types of fraudulent 
documents or documents that are fraudulently authenticated by a bona fide 
stamp or authority. 
As Boswell (2009) argues, decision-makers often use expert evidence to make their judgements 
appear neutral as well as to make a justifiable claim to transparency and public acceptance. Our 
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research shows it is possible that an institutional emphasis is emerging in which Pakistanis are 
regarded as frauds. Such an emphasis may lead to mutual suspicion and prejudice. In this way, 
asylum adjudication may boil down to assessing the credibility of Pakistanis as a group rather than 
focusing on individual cases. 
The Pakistani Christians we worked with were wary of what they saw as the application of double 
standards by the Home Office. As one Pakistani pastor put it: 
What puzzles me is, in one context, the Home Office claims that these state 
agencies are genuine when people say the police did not help me because they 
are corrupt, but when it comes to evidence, they say the authorities in 
Pakistan are corrupt. I see this as having double standards. 
Perceived bias in relation to immigration interlocutors personal religious identities 
Here we emphasise that the Home Office needs to expand its notion of what counts as evidence, 
and suggest that this can be achieved by drawing on the knowledge and experience of cultural and 
religious difference, particularly when dealing with cases involving religiously motivated persecution. 
As our findings suggest, given the Home Office’s limited inclusivity and openness, asylum claimants 
often lack the confidence and belief that their experiences are taken seriously and listened to by 
immigration authorities. 
For example, the Pakistani Christian asylum seekers we interviewed noted that they often 
encountered immigration interlocutors from a Pakistani Muslim heritage. This reflects the UK’s 
diverse religious groups, but some speculate that the Home Office could be deliberately allocating 
cases involving Pakistani Christians to caseworkers of a Pakistan heritage, presumably for linguistic 
reasons and assumptions of shared cultural understandings. However, due to their negative 
experiences in their country of origin, the Christians we interviewed reported that they often lost 
the confidence and courage to give evidence of their persecution verbally and defend their asylum 
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cases when faced with individuals whom they perceived to be from the perpetrator group, Pakistani 
Muslims. Participants routinely drew our attention to their refusal letters, which in most cases 
included Muslim names as signatories. Often they linked negative asylum decisions to the religious 
identities of the immigration officials who handled their cases. Such concerns were raised in the 
context of the Home Offices refusal to accept claimants’ requests for non-Muslim caseworkers on 
the basis that the system does not keep a database of its employees’ religious beliefs. 
Claims of religious prejudice and bias were also made about other interlocutors such as interpreters, 
whom the Home Office regards as mere conduits through which immigration officials and asylum 
seekers achieve meaningful discourse (see Gib and Good, 2014 for a detailed discussion). The 
participants alleged that interpreters of similar national heritage but from the Muslim majority, were 
ignorant of appropriate language to describe Christian experiences, and even undermined or 
manipulated accounts in a discriminatory fashion. 
The need for religious diversity, especially in relation to Home Office interlocutors, was succinctly 
articulated by the Pakistani pastor we cited earlier as follows: 
In the same way the Home Office is using Muslim Urdu speakers, they should 
also consider using Urdu speakers who are Christians … or they should at least 
invite a Christian country expert such as a Pakistani pastor to come and sit 
there … because the Christian language is not familiar to Muslims. Here in the 
UK, religion is not given any value. The difference is that in Pakistan, that is an 
Islamic country, life is about religion … so refugees are so particular as they 
believe that these Home Office interlocutors are Muslims first, then UKBA 
workers second. 
We suggest that opening up the asylum system through the involvement of, for example, 
interpreters and experts with the knowledge and understanding of the Christian faith and the 
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manner in which it is practiced and experienced in Pakistan would help to generate confidence and 
trust among Christian asylum-seekers, perhaps even in cases where a claim is unsuccessful. 
Conclusion 
Concerns about diversity, community cohesion and the related public fear in the UK of infiltration 
from Muslim extremists shape both contemporary political discourse and the current restrictive 
border control mechanisms. As a result, the Pakistani Christians seeking asylum in the UK may be 
caught between a rock and a hard place. Initially, the reception experience of Pakistani Christians 
challenges the neutrality of immigration controls that, in practice, appear to be designed to target 
immigrants of particular ethnic backgrounds for increased scrutiny. In this context, Pakistani 
Christians can be subject to misdirected Islamophobia, within the immigration and asylum system 
given the assumption that the Islamic religion is a core identity of all Pakistani immigrants.  Indeed, 
as Jubany (2011) argues, the tendency to lump together individuals from a particular country/region 
into a single group seems to be a sub-culture of the British asylum system as informed by the meta-
message of disbelief. This points to the limits to openness and transparency within the UK’s 
supposedly evidence-based immigration policy. 
At the same time, in the adjudication of faith-based claims, Pakistani Christians often found 
themselves confronted with complex obstacles in their endeavour to provide successful evidence of 
their asylum claim. We have thus sought to make visible the monsters that could be hiding in the 
UK’s evidence-based approaches to determining refugee status, which point to the limited plurality 
and diversity in the sources and forms of evidence on which the Home Office draws. 
Our research has analysed the challenges faced by Pakistani Christians in establishing their Christian 
identity, and their associated experience of persecution. Our data show that in the absence of good 
evidence, immigration officials often treat the Christian faith as a mere religious observance (judged 
from a western perspective) as opposed to being a core component of one’s identity (hence the 
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need to be assessed in the context in which it is practiced) (Nettleship 2015), requiring officials to be 
better informed and better trained. 
We have also problematised the external evidence or country of origin information published by the 
Home Office, which forms the basis of decisions on Pakistani Christians’ claims to asylum. This 
evidence appears to underestimate the extent and forms of persecution experienced by Christians in 
Pakistan. For these Christians, both in Pakistan and many other Muslim majority countries, faith not 
only informs their identity but shapes all aspects of an individual’s private and public life. This 
reflects both the way in which Christians themselves experience their faith and also how they are 
regarded and treated by non-Christians (as employers, neighbours, the police and the judiciary). 
Finally, we have drawn attention to what appears to be a lack of religious diversity in the 
immigration interlocutors (though in a supposedly religious neutral asylum system) and its impact 
upon the ability of Pakistani Christians to defend their claims verbally. Our participants routinely 
made claims of religious discrimination and bias in a context where their asylum cases are frequently 
handled and facilitated by caseworkers and interpreters of Pakistani Muslim heritage. We see this 
chapter as filling a significant gap, not only in terms of evidence, but also in current research and 
public debates on asylum seekers from Muslim majority countries. 
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